The Knowable and the Ineffable: An object-oriented reading of Enric Miralles' design approach

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Since the early 2010s, Graham Harman's Object-oriented Ontology (OOO) has drawn significant attention to architecture, whose influenced areas have reconfigured its methods, principles, and value systems around discourses centered on reality in itself, autonomy, and aesthetics. This means that architecture and its projects are specific 'realities' in their own right that transcends any epistemological consideration. Besides, each reality can manifest itself in multiple ways through its 'qualities' – some known, and most unknown. However, each of these manifestations (or their sum) is incomplete in the fullness of its reality. In this double condition of a unitary reality surrounded by multiple features/profiles, the (architectural) object emerges as an ambiguous entity for the senses and the intellect, given that it can never be objectively defined because it can never be fully apprehended. Faced with the impossibility of an ontological knowledge of the project, contemporary architects attached to OOO have explored various aesthetic regimes to instill multiple understandings in the audience[1].

However, artistic, aesthetic, or poetic interests are not new to architecture. For the present case, the architectural thinking of the offices in which Enric Miralles participated stands out here as a paradigmatic example, surely not the only one, whose discourse and methods exceeded practical needs and superficial stylistic concerns[2]. The Spanish architect had no interest in visual form or decoration problems as such[3], nor in an architecture that only "solves problems, [...] posing problems is more gratifying"[4]. In his architecture, as he commented, "what is out there, what originates our projects, is extremely important"[5]. "What is beyond [...] What is not seen"[6], other authors remark about his works. This way of thinking developed a personal and unique willingness to design out of curiosity to discover the project's intrinsic possibilities. As Miralles said: "I work from curiosity, from getting into things, from discovering them, from finding possibilities"[7].

While Miralles could not have known about OOO – his professional activity developed roughly two decades before Harman's work entered the architectural scene – there are enough overlaps to suggest a profound linkage between them: a shared interest in the knowable features and the ineffable reality of the (architectural) object. On this basis, this paper connects the architect's design approach to OOO and examines their reciprocal contributions. In this way, Miralles' complex thinking will find, retrospectively, an appropriate theoretical framework in Harman's metaphysical system, and the architect's methodology and understanding of the project will enrich the current architectural/aesthetic discourse linked to OOO.

To assess these assumptions, Section 2 looks at why the architectural project (AP) is an autonomous object in OOO's sense and how Miralles' design thinking already realized a similar condition. Section 3 analyzes the the two authors' interest in aesthetics as a cognitive method (especially mimesis, allure/allusion, and metaphor) and Miralles' additional stance to erase his own judgment of the architectural result so as not to restrict the beholder's experience. By way of conclusion, Section 4 highlights the mutual benefits of combining Miralles' and Harman's oeuvres.

The architectural project as an autonomous object

Harman's theory holds that everything in the world is an 'object' in its own right[8]. To make this point, OOO separates our knowledge of objects from their ungraspable reality[9]. Otherwise, the object is unfortunately reduced to epistemological considerations: either (1) what it is made of or produced with, which in architecture means its physical aspects (material base of the building, drawings, models), the motivations behind the process of designing it (moral issues, history, environmental factors, socio-political circumstances, technological applications, the architect's brilliant visions); or (2) what it does, i.e., its immaterial manifestations (programmatic aspects, events, impressions)[10]. Each of these approaches tends to be seen as a truth that denigrates the others. The unfortunate consequence of such exclusive epistemological concerns is the lack of coexistence between them and the reality that unites them[11]. Basing designing only on these issues "reduces the complexity that comes from the real, the complexity of the things"[12], Miralles reminded us.

An alternative to such approaches is to capitalize on the never-tangible and self-sustaining reality beneath the surface[13]. Appearance and performativity must be set aside if we are to take stock of its depth, even though it is unknown. Miralles was aware of this situation when he said that "[w]e move on the surface without knowing what we have below"[14]. Therefore, any manifestation of the project is a 'vague approximation' of what lies behind it. The project's surface cannot be the center of discussion. As Miralles claimed, "formal descriptions or [...] surfaces, folds, shifts, etc. [...] are excessively distant definitions that make the projects seem more like caricatures"[15]. In a similar vein, Harman criticizes our erroneous tendency to reduce "objects to a mere caricature of their total reality"[16]. Qualities or manifestations are partial and incomplete features that provide some knowledge about the object through epistemological inquisitiveness, but cannot define or altogether apprehend its ontological nature.

From an object-oriented perspective, what makes an AP's reality the way it is is its 'autonomous existence'. The mere act of existing, i.e., of being, is sufficient to be an object. Such a mode of existence is autonomous because it is different from any other, and cannot be reduced to any of its expressions or how it is cognized. Each AP is an object in itself. The project's reality is ineffable; there is no form (physical, intellectual, or emotional) that adequately expresses its being. Unlike previous theories of autonomy in architecture (Rossi or Eisenman), a theory of ontological autonomy can only be 'identified' rather than defined; one can only realize that the object exists on its own terms[17]. Rather than provide a definitive, unitary, and absolute method capable of unfolding any essence, an object-oriented approach makes clear that any cognitive effort in the design process or experience is incomplete compared to the fullness and richness of the AP as an autonomous object[18].

This is nothing negative. On the contrary, it creates an open framework in which each project, although it is an ontological, finite, unique unity, is epistemologically inexhaustible. For this reason, one can "never understand [the] projects as terminated pieces"[19], stated Miralles. This constant feeling of incompleteness leads to "sacrifice[e] the specific nature of the [tangible] situation to the application of a distant reality..."[20]. The awareness of the AP's autonomous condition makes the plurality of its sensual profiles evident, which allows us to develop a non-objective approach to the object for the constant discovery of other unknown features. "I like to approach things always through approximated solutions"[21], said the architect. The project cannot be categorically registered as truth in any of its physical or mental formalizations. This justifies the architect and the philosopher's interest in the multiple 'variations' in which an object can manifest[22]. "I tend to operate by variation," the architect claimed, "because I want the elements to be able to incorporate this variety of material conditions. I never work by reduction: I try to reveal the multiplicities, the singularities..."[23].

Ironically, this approach to things allows for more varied knowledge production than the previous unitary knowledge-based methods. Since no particular reality can be pinpointed, there is a circularity of multiple approximations. Different (even contradictory) understandings of the AP are equally correct and, at the same time, equally incomplete. As Wolf D. Prix says, "everybody is right, but nothing is correct"[24]. An object-oriented approach produces cumulative and diverse knowledge, as what we understand as 'knowledge' becomes broader beyond conventional categorization[25]. Designing

and experiencing architecture is a "process of productive accumulation"[26] instead of unitary, stylistic, and pre-existing assumptions. Hence, the distance between what we know about a project and what this project is creates an ever-present unknown excess, "a surplus of reality beyond any of its discernible features"[27], as Harman puts it. However, such a surplus cannot exist without the autonomous reality of the object. Consequently, each AP has a specific space of abundance populated by more unknown 'caricatures' (variations) that can potentially be revealed. This condition interested Miralles above and beyond the immediate practical or functional terms of the project[28]. In short, given that any AP is an autonomous reality that escapes any formalization, the manifestations that refer to such a withdrawn reality are multiple. Since our cognitive system cannot comprehend the entirety of such abundance, there is always a surplus in each AP that is potentially knowable.

Therefore, the relevant question for architectural design concerning autonomy is not knowing the exact terms that comprise the existence or essence of the AP's reality, but merely 'being aware of its ontological condition of autonomy'. What does it mean for designers and beholders to know that each AP is a reality in itself beyond its manifestations and our knowledge of them? For Miralles and Harman, it implies going beyond the knowledge-based approaches in favor of a form of cognition that reveals and takes advantage of the object's colorful interior. Both assume a "je ne sais qoui"[29] of the (architectural) object not as a goal to domesticate, but as an ungraspable point of reference to orbit around. As the architect put it:

The force (of observation) does not consist of grasping the simple truth of things and expressing it with the greatest possible precision, but discovering concealed and hidden connections... We abandon the daily and habitual lanes, and we let ourselves be carried away by a surprising vision of things...[30]

Aesthetics as a form of cognition

To address the double condition of the (architectural) object, that is, to be simultaneously an ineffable unity of reality and a knowable multiplicity of manifestations, Harman and Miralles advocate a similar form of cognition: 'aesthetics'[31]. As it will become apparent, the development of their aesthetic discourse and methodologies revolves around the notion of 'mimesis' and 'allure' (or allusion), which are put into practice through the tool of 'metaphor'. In addition to this, the depersonalization of the architectural qualities that Miralles practiced during the formalization process deserves attention.

However, none of this can happen without a primary condition: the beholder's involvement as a fundamental piece in the aesthetic activity. As Harman puts it, "the basic unit of aesthetics is neither the art [or architectural] object nor its beholder, but rather the two in combination as a single new object"[32]. Consequently, aesthetic responses can be considered another form of expression of the AP, such as the building, the drawings, the models, or the generative idea. This was already clear to German aesthetic theories. As Heinrich Wölfflin commented: "We designate the effect that we receive the *impression*. And we understand this impression to be the *expression* of the object"[33].

Mimesis

Hence, the beholder is "an active performer of the missing object"[34] (Harman) because "the spectator participates in the intuition of the work...."[35] (Miralles). Both authors define this form of participation within the aesthetic unit through 'mimesis'. In the reformulation of the term, mimesis is something internal to the object, not something external that seeks to replicate a foreign referential model. In Miralles'swords: "Imitation [as mimesis] no longer proposes to linger on the external appearance and tries to copy faithfully... Imitation belongs to another sphere, to seek the [architect/beholder's] procedure, not the result but its turning out..."[36]. By the same token, "the question of mimesis," Harman states, "has more to do with our own role, as performers, in sustaining the work of art"[37]. In the OOO's mimesis, the beholder 'becomes' him/herself an (internal) "imitation" of the object[38]. In short, s/he is another medium of expression of the project: "aesthetic participants themselves provide that medium"[39], he concludes elsewhere. Instead of defending the visual and literal referentiality of pre-existing referents outside the AP, the authors' notion of mimesis is not physical or retinal, but is about the spectator's 'modus operandi' within the aesthetic experience. The architect highlighted this condition during the design process in his "desire to enter" ("quererse adentrar") into the AP, "because I have hardly ever done anything else in my projects"[40]. Miralles' "entering" the thing is Harman's "becoming" the thing.

In this context, the beholder's aesthetic participation (designer or spectator) proceeds in two ways: s/he accesses the knowable through the artistic or architectural material, and then the captured profile is rendered 'in' him/herself. The AP's broad spectrum of sensual expression is particularized, meaning it is sorted according to the participant's cognitive faculties[41]. In the architectural or artistic experience, it is evident that the ability to infuse an aesthetic response depends on the syntax and composition of the visual, physical forms to provoke one or another aesthetic impression. However, the triggering medium's nature also plays a vital role in how the beholder expresses his/her impressions[42]. The more open the manifestation, the greater the multiplicity of the project. What forms and visual arrangements are capable of instilling which aesthetic registers is the ongoing debate among today's architects working with OOO's principles[43].

Allure/allusion

If mimesis is the framework for accessing and representing some knowable features, 'allure' (from the object to the beholder) or 'allusion' (from the beholder to the object) establishes the method for an indirect connection with the ineffable reality. It creates a cognitive mode where the object's presence is noticeable without being obvious. Allusion goes beyond the literal and the tangible to elicit an unutterable indication that, paradoxically, needs the literal and the tangible as the door to the allusive object[44]. For Harman, allure/allusion is the indirect approach to reality, which lacks translatability[45]. While the project's emotional effects are another type of the AP's multiple formal expressions, the allusion/allure escapes analytical considerations; it cannot be formally explained[46]. Allusion/allure is a 'singular' and non-paraphrasable awareness of the object's existence. Like mimesis, the current notion of allusion does not indicate something external, but is the internal contract in any aesthetic unit in which the object shows its presence to the beholder in an inarticulate way.

Once again, Miralles also accounted for "[t]his allusive mode of expression" of things, "an interior discourse – parallel to a visual one"[47]. When OOO locates the allusion in the gap between superficial qualities and withdrawn reality, the architect recognizes a similar relationship between the outside and the inside of a thing: a tension in which the surface "leads us on its paths 'to the depths' [...] one resorts to evocation, metaphor, allusion. [...] Immerse yourself in the artwork, make the shadows speak... [...] what is not seen, 'what the tree, the tower, or a building hide from us'..."[48].

Metaphor

In the last quote, Miralles anticipates the device of mimesis and allusion: the 'metaphor'. According to Harman, "metaphor is precisely what points us *towards* the depth of things"[49]. It is claimed that this depth is double because it simultaneously unveils some knowable features and alludes to the ineffable reality. More in detail, Miralles' metaphorical approach to design relates directly to OOO's concept of 'fusion', in which some attributes or qualities are assigned to a completely unknown entity[50]. For this reason, a design process devoid of preconceptions is always 'blind'. Designing is "a metaphor with one of the terms deleted": the AP[51]. For the sake of clarity, consider the example of the 'comb' metaphor in EMBT's proposal for a stadium in Chemnitz [Fig. 01]:

There is an analogy between the movement of people and hairstyle, because when you see a hairstyle, you ask, 'How can they do that?' And really, it's the same as combing your hair: half over this side and half on the other. And really, you organize people that way too. A comb is very good for organizing people[52].

The comb is not addressed through its visual qualities to be replicated on an architectural scale; that would be the "classical" mimesis that Miralles fervently rejected or the "literalism" dismissed by Harman[53]. On the contrary, the architects reveal the 'non-obvious' knowable qualities that the comb

and the PA-object have in common. In this case, the aesthetic encounter of the authors with the project fuses an already intrinsic but unknown organizational capacity of the AP found in the comb. Therefore, "[t]he analogy of structure is sought, not of image"[54], Miralles concluded elsewhere. This metaphorical approach overcomes any assumed cognition of things by a free perception that is not subordinate to pre-ideas[55]. That means an "attitude towards things in which you are able to perceive more than you can think"[56], said the architect.

In the stadium's design process, the initial metaphorical cognition triggers a chain of different formalizations of the project in different media almost simultaneously. In this instantaneous sequence, the architect first enters his/her thought thanks to the comb's qualities. Like the emotional impressions in the art experience, such thought is just another manifestation of the AP that takes place 'in' the designer, who is another medium of expression. Second, this thought unfolds drawings on paper, which in the Chemnitz's project are a face with tribunes as hair and the shape of a stadium with hair as tribunes [first two sketches in Fig. 01]. This dual mechanism of how a thought is constructed and immediately actualized in a sketch is central to Miralles' design approach[57]. Indeed, Miralles was obsessed with the latter (the translation of thought to paper) happening automatically, which was the subject of his doctoral thesis[58]. He rejected any self-reflection on the thought that could corrupt the unveiling of physical manifestations. There is a desire to eliminate any external distractions (i.e., his own assumptions) and keep the AP's formalizations clean of anything that does not belong to its domain. Miralles calls this thought-to-paper channel "graphic thinking"[59]. Here are some representative instances on the subject of the many that populate his dissertation:

Strip it of the attributes of the observation, and leave the trace of the annotation on the paper[60].
Notating outside of ourselves, in a carefree way[61].
Strokes in which a thought is inscribed[62].
Strokes deposit the thought on things[63].
One follows a thought in which its graphical expression is identical to the thought that animates it...[64]

Depersonalizing the physical architectural expression

Miralles' graphic thinking points to the 'depersonalization of the architectural result' far from its author, regardless of whether the initial step comes from the author's intimate, aesthetic, and mimetic act of becoming the object. As Heidegger reminds us: "What is to be unveiled should become manifest, solely in view of its own self, in whatever its pure essential character and specific mode of being may be"[65]. What is to be unveiled is the AP's own sensual material. In this way, one does not face the author's motivations in his architecture. It is argued that Miralles rejected not only the

imposition of his (rational) idea and external references but also the literal translation of his (irrational) aesthetic response from the AP[66]. Graphic thinking aims to bring the AP's intrinsic forms[67]. Miralles' ignorance and aesthetic impressions of the project are not the only ones of the project. If the architectural representation only expressed that, the author would restrict the public's cognition, that is, the (mis)readings of the work and the individual access to the knowable would be predetermined. To avoid that, the architect's conscious action to "notate outside himself" should be seen as a declaration of intent to open up the spectrum of knowable profiles of the AP beyond what his capabilities can address alone. When each aesthetic unit (object plus beholder) has its own personalized degree of unknowability, the beholder has his/her own access to the object's knowable characteristics without external regulation. Miralles prevented this imposition by excluding from the outcome any trace of his architectural criteria, strange as it may seem. As he said, "to judge that what you really understand by architecture is actually something that is scarcely part of your conversation"[68].

On this basis, the AP's 'caricature' frees itself from the architect's direct or indirect intentionality. Each architectural manifestation becomes a 'placeholder' in which each spectator finds his/her own way towards the project without the author's reasoning or emotional charge restricting the scene's possibilities. Only then is the spectator "emancipated" *à la* Rancière[69]. The beholder becomes another "creator" of the AP, unveiling alternative profiles, many of which the architect would never have predicted[70] [Fig. 02].

Miralles' graphic thought intends to keep the AP widely open by omitting his emotional impressions and judgment about architectural formalization. His aesthetic experience or architectural ideas in the design process become irrelevant to the architectural experience. Proof of this is that the 'comb' is not a recognizable presence in the Chemnitz Stadium, nor the 'fish' at the Madrid Editorial Headquarters[71]. The architect's impressions do not indoctrinate or govern someone else's apprehension of the projects.

Hence, the metaphor is not a narrative instrument of justification and reduction of the work, but rather a propelling tool for the architect. In Miralles' design approach, the metaphor dies in the design process and, therefore, does not condition the beholder's understanding of the AP. For multiplicity to be effective, the universal shared experience of the transcendental subject must be subverted. For beholder A to grasp some unique profiles of the project other than beholder B, there must be an 'individualized' sense of incompleteness in the cognition of any aesthetic unit.

Conclusion

Although separated in time, this paper demonstrates how Enric Miralles' design

approach and Graham Harman's Object-oriented Ontology blend seamlessly. Both based their work on the autonomous reality of the (architectural) object that is not reducible to epistemological concerns. The awareness of this metaphysical condition produces, paradoxically, an epistemological reaction in which aesthetics appears as a form of cognition that opens up the exuberant interior of the project.

On this basis, Miralles contributes to OOO by emerging as a strong precedent from which the ongoing architectural debate on objects can benefit. Of special interest is his epistemological approach to the AP's reality in the design phase based on aesthetic strategies. This means that aesthetic responses are not exclusive to the architectural experience, but the Spanish architect introduced them as the basis of designing. In short, 'the design process is an aesthetic cognition in itself'. Instead of domesticating what forms can produce emotional or multiple responses, "I don't care about the form of a building"[72], he stated. For the architectural task, he appropriated the aesthetic process as such to place himself outside the architectural expression right after. In this way, 'his' aesthetic impressions are not imposed on the audience, which frees the architect from a design mode that 'scientifically' forces controlled regimes of literalism and ambiguity in experience.

Conversely, OOO contributes to Miralles' architecture by providing an ontological framework. It is claimed that "what is beyond" in his projects is the architectural project itself as an autonomous entity. His architecture has been described as a "hermetic, inaccessible, difficult, seductive, and labyrinthine universe"[73]. However, this is the very nature of 'each' (architectural) object. In other words, a self-sustaining reality behind any architectural manifestation is not exclusive to Miralles' projects; it is the default condition for 'any' project. Thus, each architectural project acquires ontological support under an object-oriented base that unifies the AP's individuality while maintaining its abundance of expressions. What stands out about Miralles is how he understood this condition and developed a design approach accordingly. Likewise, his methods based on the design tools of mimesis, allusion, and metaphor also acquire theoretical support through the arguments of Harman.

Beyond the examined overlaps between both authors, 'time' and 'mereology' are issues that require further consideration[74].

Object-oriented thinking allows methods and practices, many of which remain to be seen, that enhance the inexhaustibility of things without losing their identity. Therefore, any emerging epistemological approach based on these principles should resonate with what Peter Handke says: "[...] challenging one to engage in unceasing daily discovery that led to no specific outcome, nothing that could be exploited, unless perhaps for keeping possibilities open – discovery as a way of keeping possibilities open?"[75]

1. These aesthetic effects are based on mystery, doubt, or curiosity. For an overview, see Todd Gannon et al., "The Object Turn. A Conversation," *Log* 33 (Winter 2015): 73–94.

2. The offices are Miralles/Pinós (1983-1900), solo practice (1990-1994), and EMBT (Enric Miralles & Benedetta Tagliabue 1994-2000).

3. Josep M. Rovira, ed., *Enric Miralles 1972-2000*, Colección Arquia/Temas 33 (Barcelona: Fundación Arquia, 2011), 7.

4. ("resuelve problemas, [...] plantear problemas es lo más gratificante"). Ibid., 12 [translation by the author].

5. Enric Miralles, Emilio Tuñón, and Luis Moreno Mansilla, "Notes on an Informal Conversation," in *Enric Miralles + Benedetta Tagliabue 1995-2000*, vol. 100+101 (Madrid: El Croquis, 2000), 21.

6. ("Lo que está más allá [...] Lo que no se ve"). Rovira, *Enric Miralles 1972-2000*, 8 [translation by the author].

7. ("Yo trabajo a través de la curiosidad, de meterme en las cosas, de descubrirlas, de encontrar las posibilidades"). Enric Miralles, "Entrevista a Enric Miralles, Cronotopias," *Metalocus*, no. 3 (1999): 14–31 [translation by the author].

8. 'Flat ontology' is the term attached to contemporary theories of objects that claim the same right to exist for everything (be it physical, immaterial, living, dead, real, imaginary, big or small). In contrast, each maintains a particular and specific mode of existence different from the others. As Ian Bogost summarizes, *"all things equally exist, yet they do not exist equally"*. For more about flat ontology, see Ian Bogost, *Alien Phenomenology, or What It's Like to Be a Thing* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), 11–19.

9. As Levi R. Bryant, a philosopher associated with the OOO movement, remarks: "The *being* of objects is an issue distinct from the question of our *knowledge* of objects". Levi R. Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects* (Ann Arbor, MI: Open Humanities Press, 2011), 18.

10. For Harman's claims against epistemological reduction, see Graham Harman, "Undermining, Overmining, and Duomining: A Critique," in *ADD Metaphysics*, ed. Jenna Sutela (Helsinki: Aalto University Design Research Laboratory, 2013), 40–51. For the adaptation of this criticism to architecture, see Mark Foster Gage, "Killing Simplicity. Object-Oriented Philosophy in Architecture," *Log* 33 (Winter 2015): 98–102.

11. For example, Miralles lamented the demagoguery behind the "architecture of diagrams," something that resonates with what Mark F. Gages criticizes today as "the architecture of the arrows". See Carles Muro, ed., *Conversaciones con Enric Miralles* (Barcelona: Editorial Gustavo Gili, 2016), 184; Gage, "Killing Simplicity. Object-Oriented Philosophy in Architecture," 100–101.

12. ("reducir la complejidad que proviene de lo real, de la complejidad de las cosas"). Muro, *Conversaciones con Enric Miralles*, 37 [translation by the author]. To put it plainly, the problem is not that architecture does not have to address these important questions; the problem is to minimize the architecture exclusively to one or the other of these forms of knowledge while ignoring the myriad profiles that an AP has. Equally useless is to base the design objective on revealing the AP's essence, because the terms of its existence cannot be objectively known.

13. As Bryant says, "questions of ontology must precede questions of epistemology or questions of our *access* to objects". Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects*, 18.

14. ("Avanzamos por la superficie sin saber lo que tenemos debajo"). Enric Miralles, "Cosas Vistas a Izquierda y a Derecha (Sin Gafas)" (Barcelona, Universidad Politécnica de Barcelona - ETSAB, 1987), 1:14 [translation by the author].

15. Miralles, Tuñón, and Moreno Mansilla, "Notes on an Informal Conversation," 21. Although Miralles only refers in this quote to material aspects of the project, it is argued that the same applies to immaterial manifestations such as thoughts or emotional impressions.

16. Graham Harman, *Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things* (Chicago, IL: Open Court, 2005), 74.

17. What is open to criticism in the theories of autonomy of the 20th century is that, in one way or another, those authors ended up promoting those forms of heteronomy that they tried to avoid. This is because it was intended to define the terms in which autonomy should be given. Ontological definitions were imposed illogically from an epistemological perspective by the spectator (in this case, architects or theorists). For example, for Emil Kauffmann, autonomy is defined by the "autonomy of form"; that is, it is decided from the outside of the project that only certain visual forms and compositional arrangements guarantee the question of autonomy. Aldo Rossi built his theory on a similar basis. The Italian architect definitively renounced any ontological definition of autonomy when he affirms: "I have never spoken of an absolute autonomy of architecture or of an architecture *an sich*", concerning the Kantian 'Ding-an-sich'. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (1966; repr., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), 169 in the "Introduction to the Portuguese Edition." Even Peter Eisenman, who defends a metaphysical condition of architecture, is debatable as 'he' establishes the terms of that metaphysical condition. He imposed that the autonomy of architecture can only be in (generic) form, ignoring all the multiple ingredients (some known and the majority unknown) that make up the project's reality.

18. This does not mean that the architect cannot create the AP in itself. Even so, s/he cannot account for the entirety of his/her creation, just as parents do not know everything about their sons and daughters.

19. Enric Miralles and Alejandro Zaera Polo, "A Conversation With Enric Miralles," in *Enric Miralles 1990-1994*, vol. 72 [II] (Madrid: El Croquis, 1995), 265.

20. Ibid., 266.

21. ("A mí me gusta acercarme a las soluciones siempre por soluciones aproximadas"). Miralles, "Entrevista a Enric Miralles, Cronotopias" [translation by the author].

22. Whereas Harman claims, "I defend a method of variation, changing the exact features of [the] works...before it becomes a different work," Miralles wanted to "open up the concept of the [project] to a multiplicity of readings..." Quotes respectively in: Joseph Bedford, ed., *Is There an Object Oriented Architecture? Engaging Graham Harman* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020), 36; Miralles and Zaera Polo, "A Conversation With Enric Miralles," 272.

23. Miralles and Zaera Polo, "A Conversation with Enric Miralles," 272.

24. Wolf D. Prix and Thom Mayne, *DigitalFUTURES: From Decon to AI: AI and Architectural Practice*, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OlvYzmWuMsU min. 28:09.

25. Investigations of what we understand as real versus unreal or true versus false are common ground for OOO's architectural discourses. As David Ruy states: "We need an architecture that is completely devoted to the problem of the real, but one that is aware of its uncertainty." David Ruy, "Weird Realism," in *The Estranged Object*, ed. Michael Young (Chicago, IL: Graham Foundation, 2015), 8. For an example of our categorization system's obsolescence, see Ferda Kolatan, "In Pursuit of The Allusive Object," in *Aesthetics Equals Politics*, ed. Mark Foster Gage (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2019), 83–97. See also the OOO concept of "knowledge without truth" in Graham Harman, *Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of Everything* (London: Penguin UK, 2017), 185–93.

26. Miralles and Zaera Polo, "A Conversation With Enric Miralles," 269.

27. Harman, *Guerrilla Metaphysics*, 188.

28. An example of how Miralles looked beyond the immediate programmatic needs can be seen in a conference on the Huesca Sports Center in Enric Miralles, *1989 - Enric Miralles - Ultimas Obras y Proyectos (Nov 1989)* (Lecture at ETSA Valencia, 1989), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VEx8MXu2-TQ min. 57:20 min.

29. Both authors use the French expression "je ne sais quoi" for the (architectural) object's elusiveness linked to aesthetic experience. See Miralles, "Cosas Vistas a Izquierda y a Derecha (Sin Gafas)," 1:8; Graham Harman, *Architecture and Objects* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, forthcoming), chap. 2c.

30. ("La fuerza (de la observación) no consiste en captar la verdad sencilla de las cosas y de expresarla con la mayor precisión posibles, sino en descubrir conexiones disimuladas y escondidas... Se abandonan los carriles de lo cotidiano y habitual, y nos dejamos llevar ante una visión sorprendente de las cosas..."). Miralles, "Cosas Vistas a Izquierda y a Derecha (Sin Gafas)," 1:9 [translation by the author].

31. For the philosopher, and derived from his readings of Heidegger's "ontological difference", aesthetics is the internal study between a unity and its multiplicity, while, for the architect, aesthetic evaluation is something based on intuition far from moral values. See Graham Harman, *Art and Objects* (Medford, MA: Polity Press, 2020), xi–xii; Harman, *Architecture and Objects*, chap. 4a; Miralles, "Cosas Vistas a Izquierda y a Derecha (Sin Gafas)," 1:9.

32. Harman, *Art and Objects*, 8.

33. Heinrich Wölfflin, "Prolegomena to a Psychology of Architecture," in *Empathy, Form, and Space*, ed. Harry Francis Mallgrave and Eleftherios Ikonomou (1886; repr., Santa Monica, CA: Getty Center for the History of Art and the Humanities, 1994), 150.

34. Harman, *Art and Objects*, 136.

35. ("El espectador participa en la intuición de la obra..."). Miralles, "Cosas Vistas a Izquierda y a Derecha (Sin Gafas)," 1:9 [translation by the author].

36. ("La imitación [como mímesis] ya no se propone demorarse en el aspecto exterior y trata de copiar con fidelidad... La imitación pertenece a otra esfera, buscar el procedimiento, no el resultado sino su resultar"). Ibid. [translation by the author]. Miralles addressed mimesis in relation to the spectator's performative attitude, mainly in his doctoral thesis.

37. Graham Harman, "A New Sense of Mimesis," in *Aesthetics Equals Politics: New Discourses across Art, Architecture, and Philosophy*, ed. Mark Foster Gage (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2019), 59.

38. Ibid., 58.

39. Graham Harman, "Materialism Is Not the Solution. On Matter, Form, and Mimesis," *The Nordic Journal of Aesthetics*, no. 47 (2014): 109.

40. ("porque además yo en mis proyectos casi no he hecho nunca nada más"). Enric Miralles, "Acceder. Transcription of Miralles's Lecture at the Universidad Internacional Menéndez Pelayo de Santander.," in *Enric Miralles 1955-2000*, ed. Carolina B. Garcia Estevez, DC Papers 17–18 (1993; repr., Barcelona: Departament de Composició Arquitectònica UPC, 2009), 19 [translation by the author].

41. Therefore, each beholder's subjectivity is part of the project's formal expressions because it is the exclusive common ground that 'this' AP shares with 'that' beholder.

42. For what 2D media (drawings or images) only ask for mental participation – therefore, the aesthetic response is not readable for external viewers – spatial manifestations force the beholder to participate 'physically', such as moving or performing the space to acquire the aesthetic impression. Thus, this 'movement or use' is simultaneous access to the emotional content and an expression of AP. This 'use' of space differs from any notion of functionalism because the architect cannot predetermine these intimate aesthetic implications.

43. For example, Tom Wiscombe works around an aesthetic regime of mystery through techniques of discretizing the building in parts in a non-obvious way, hovering and grounding them, and with a surface treatment of "tattoos" that does not follow the mass geometric logic. See Tom Wiscombe, "Discreteness, or Towards a Flat Ontology of Architecture," *Project*, no. 3 (Spring 2014). David Ruy is interested in the notion of estrangement through the defamiliarization of daily objects. See Gannon et al., "The Object Turn. A Conversation," 77–81. Or the interest of Mark F. Gage lies in instilling the spectator's curiosity to produce other realities through a high-resolution architectural language (kit-bashing) working at different aesthetic distances, see Mark Foster Gage, *Designing Social Equality: Architecture, Aesthetics, and the Perception of Democracy* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2019), chap. 3.

44. Steven Shaviro describes Harman's "allure" as follows: "This is the attraction of something that has retreated into its own depths. An object is alluring when it does not just display particular qualities, but also insinuates the existence of something deeper, something hidden and inaccessible, something that cannot actually be displayed". Steven Shaviro, "The Actual Volcano: Whitehead, Harman, and the Problem of Relations," in *The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism*, ed. Levi R. Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman, 2011, 289.

45. For a comprehensive understanding of the OOO's notion of allure and allusion, see Harman, *Guerrilla Metaphysics*, chap. 9c; Graham Harman, *Weird Realism: Lovecraft and Philosophy* (Alresford, UK: John Hunt Publishing, 2012).

46. Emotions are articulated. They have structure, so they are form, since various emotional profiles can be differentiated within various viewers. The difference between emotional impacts on space becomes evident when they become subareas of study of anthropology and psychology. On the contrary, allusion/allure is an indication that happens or not; it does not have in-betweens.

47. ("Este modo de expresión alusivo, [...] un discurso interior–paralelo a uno visual"). Miralles, "Cosas Vistas a Izquierda y a Derecha (Sin Gafas)," 1:13, 5 [translation by the author].

48. ("nos llevaran por sus caminos 'hacia el fondo' [...] se acude a la evocación, la metáfora, las alusiones [...] Sumergirse en la obra de arte, hacer hablar a las sombras... [...] lo que no se ve, 'lo que el árbol, la torre o un edificio nos esconden'..."). Ibid., 1:14, 10, 2 [translation by the author].

49. Harman, *Object-Oriented Ontology*, 204.

50. For more about the OOO term fusion, see Harman, *Weird Realism*, 237–40.

51. Ibid., 238.

52. Miralles, Tuñón, and Moreno Mansilla, "Notes on an Informal Conversation," 12. I would replace the word "analogy" in the quote with "metaphorical relationship."

53. Miralles and Zaera Polo, "A Conversation With Enric Miralles," 265; Harman, *Art and Objects*, chap. 3.

54. ("[se] busca ante la analogía de estructura, no de imagen"). Miralles, "Cosas Vistas a Izquierda y a Derecha (Sin Gafas)," 3:5 [translation by the author].

55. One can differentiate between 'thought' and 'idea' in Miralles. While the former is highly appreciated and comes from a dialogue with the AP, the latter is neglected as an imposing logic alien to the project's nature. As he commented, "I would replace the word idea with the word dialogue–conversation more than idea. [...] You put the idea behind, never before...". Miralles and Zaera Polo, "A Conversation With Enric Miralles," 264–65.

56. ("actitud ante las cosas en la que se [es] capaz de percibir más de lo que se puede pensar"). Miralles, "Cosas Vistas a Izquierda y a Derecha (Sin Gafas)," Annex I:34 [translation by the author].

57. It should be clarified that Miralles never used a single reference, but a multitude of metaphorical sources (visual, literary, architectural, geographical, cultural, et cetera) that formed a much more complex thought or a "tangle" ("enredo") as he called it. The graphic thinking method, explained below, is the "untangle" ("desenredo"). See Miralles, "Acceder," 19.

58. Miralles, "Cosas Vistas a Izquierda y a Derecha (Sin Gafas)."

59. Ibid., 2:138, 253. For more on Miralles' graphic thinking, see Javier Fernandez Contreras, "La Planta Miralles: Representacion y pensamiento en la Arquitectura de Enric Miralles" (Madrid, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid ETSAM, 2013), 14–25.

60. ("Despojarlo de los atributos de la observación, y dejar impresa en el papel la huella de la anotación"). Miralles, "Cosas Vistas a Izquierda y a Derecha (Sin Gafas)," 2:96 [translation by the author].

61. ("[A]notar fuera de nosotros mismos, de un modo despreocupado"). Ibid., Annex I:29 [translation by the author].

62. ("Trazos en los que se inscribe un pensamiento"). Ibid., Annex I:27 [translation by the author].

63. ("trazos depositan el pensamiento sobre las cosas"). Ibid., Annex I:8 [translation by the author].

64. ("[S]e sigue un pensamiento en el que su expresión gráfica es idéntica al pensamiento que lo anima..."). Ibid, translation by the author. To make it clear, this thought belongs to the AP manifested in the architect; it does not come from the architect's imposing idea or reason.

65. Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (1927; repr., Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982), 320. It should come as no surprise to highlight Heidegger since many of the OOO premises derive from the German philosopher's work. See Graham Harman, *The Quadruple Object* (Alresford, UK: Zero Books, 2011), chaps. 4, 6.

66. The physical formalization of the project does not come from the author's reasoning process to the selected or disciplinary problem, which would be an external restriction, nor from the one-to-one record of the author's emotional state of mind, which can be called an internal restriction, similar to many works of art that are reduced to expressions of the artist's emotions.

67. There are sufficient indicators for a future study to relate Miralles' notion of "graphic thinking" with Conrad Fiedler's "pure visibility" of the form.

68. Miralles, Tuñón, and Moreno Mansilla, "Notes on an Informal Conversation," 19–20.

69. Ranciere seeks to reverse the aesthetic and political passivity of the traditional spectator determined by artistic pedagogy (especially in theater and cinema) into an active agent with intellectual independence. Jacques Rancière, *The Emancipated Spectator*, trans. Gregory Elliott (London: Verso, 2009).

70. For Harman's comments on the "active" role of the beholder, see Harman, *Art and Objects*, 136–37. On this basis, it can be argued that the only difference between the artist/architect and the beholder is that the former goes one step further and formalizes his/her aesthetic access in an architectural or artistic medium tangible to the public, while for the latter aesthetic impressions are not exposed.

71. Miralles used the metaphor of fishes for describing that the columns of the project in Madrid flows between the visitors. See Rovira, *Enric Miralles 1972-2000*, 336.

72. ("No me preocupa en absoluto la forma de un edificio"). Anatxu Zabalbeascoa and Javier Rodriguez Marcos, eds., *Arquitecturas Del Tiempo, Miralles Tagliabue* (Barcelona: Gustavo Gili, 1999), 63 [translation by the author].

73. ("universo hermético, inaccesible, difícil, seductor, laberíntico"). Rovira, *Enric Miralles 1972-2000*, 7 [translation by the author].

74. Time is intrinsically linked to the notion of *repetition* for Miralles. For Harman, time refers to the tension between the multiple sensual qualities (SQ) of the thing and the beholder's unitary sense of reality (SO). Part-to-whole relationships are "objects that compose objects" for Harman, similar to Miralles' compositional techniques of 'projects within projects'.

75. Peter Handke, *Crossing the Sierra de Gredos (Der Bildverlust)*, trans. Krishna Winston (2002; repr., New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, eBook, 2007), chap. 9.